We consider the communication complexity of secure multiparty computations by networks of processors each with unlimited computing power. Say that an n-party protocol for a function of m bits is efficient if it uses a constant number of rounds of communication and a total number of message bits that is polynomial in max(m, n). We show that any function has an efficient protocol that achieves (rclog n)/m resilience. Ours is the first secure multiparty protocol in which the communication complexity is independent of the computational complexity of the function being computed.
1 Introduction h resilient, ,multiparty protocol allows a network of processors to compute a function of the processors' private inputs in such a way that each processor learns the result, no processor learns anything about another's private input (except what is implied by the result and its own private input). .>nd the protocol works even if some proper subset of the processors behave in an a,ditrary faulty manner. For example, a t-resilient protocol for majority-voting al!on.s all x;otcrs t,o learn who won, while preventing any coalition of t or fewer anarchists from learning the vote of an honest participant or disrupting the election.
In this paper, we make no assumptions about the computing power of the individual processors in our network. Because no such assumptions are made, all proofs of the security properties of protocols must, be argued on information-theoretic grounds. N o complexity-theoretic hypothrw.;. ~i i c h as the existence of one-way functions, are relevant.
Let n be the number of processors and m he the total number of input bits to the function being computed. We focus on three criteria for evaluating a protocol: Theorem: For any positive constant c. every function of m bits has an n-party protocol that achieves (cn log n ) / m resilience, constant round complexity, and bit complexity that is polynomial in max(rn, n).
That is, even functions whose circuit complexity is exponential have resilient multiparty protocols whose communication complexity is polynomial.
Our actual result gives a more general tradeoff and is stated precisely in Section 5.3 below.
In a resilient multiparty protocol, the processors are equally powerful, and they must cooperate in a computation because none of them alone has all of the necessary data. An alternative view of distributed computations with private data is considered in [l, 71. There one processor? who has all of the data, must cooperate with other processors becmse it lacks the power to carry out the computation. More specifically, a p-oracle instance-hiding scheme for a function f is a protocol in which a polynomialtime bounded querier consults p computationally-unlimited oracles in such a way that the querier learns the value f ( x ) , but none of the oracles learns the input z. Beaver and Feigenbaum [7] show that, for every positive constant c, every function of rn bits has an (rn -clog m)-oracle instance-hiding scheme. In this paper, we improve this general upper bound.
Theorem: For every positive constant c, every function of m bits has an (rnlclog m)-oracle instance-hiding scheme.
Zero-knowledge proof systems, as originally formulated in [25] , are two-party protocols in which the parties have a common input x, and one party (the prover) convinces the other (the verifier) that, say, f ( z ) = 1, without revealing a proof. Notarized envelope schemes allow the prover to publish a commitment to its private input 2 and then prove in zero-knowledge to the verifier that f ( x ) = i without dtxornmitting X. Many of the cost criteria that apply to resilient multiparty protocols aiso apply to notarized envelope schemes. In this paper, we are most interested in the communcation costs of a scheme -that is, its round complexity and its bit complexit!-.
We examine notarized envelope schemes in the ideal enaelope mode[: t.hat is, both prover and verifier have unlimited computational power. no r r~~p t o~r a p h i c assumptions are made, and bit commitment is assumed as a prirni'ix-e. .4ny primitive that implements bit commitment in this model is called an enc&opc , > ? t i t mf.. A natural question to ask is whether notarized envelope schemes exist in thi. model; that is, can notarized envelopes be built out of ordinary envelopes? This (i~cstion was answered in the affirmative by numerous authors (e.g., [lo: 321) ; a written account of one scheme appears in (111.
All previously published notarized envelope schemes have the iollowing feature in common: They have bit complexity proportional to the circnit Complexity of f . Here, we achieve a more communication-efficient construction of general riotarized envelope schemes.
Theorem:
In the ideal envelope model, every function has a notarized envelope scheme that has constant round complexity and bit complexity polynomial in the number of input bits.
The results given here first appeared in our Technical Memorandum [a] . In this abstract, some details of proof are omitted, because of space limitations; many of these details can be found in [6], and all will appear in our final paper.
The rest of this abstract is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief account of previous work on secure, distributed computation, with emphasis on the results that do not involve complexity-theoretic hypotheses. Notation and terminology is given in Section 3, and several necessary building blocks are recalled from the literature. Section 4 gives a precise definition of locally random reducibility and recalls the reduction given in [7] . We present our main results in Section 5; the multiparty protocol result is given last, because it relies upon the other two. [4] give protocols that achieve (n -1)/2-resilience but have the same round complexity and the same bit complexity as those in [13, 171. a The protocol of Bar-Ilan, Beaver [3] achieves (n-1)/2-resilience, constant round complexity, and bit complexity proportional to the size of Cf, if the depth of Cf is O(1ogrn).
a Chaum [16] gives an interesting protocol that can be proven (n -1)/2-resilient without complexity-theoretic hypotheses and (n -1)-resilient with complexitytheoretic hypotheses.
Throughout this paper, we use the term "secure protocol" to mean a protocol that is "resilient" against arbitrarily (i.e,, potentially malicious) faulty players. There is also a literature on a weaker notion of security -"privacy" against "honest but curious" players; refer to [5, 19 , 271 for details.
Preliminaries
We use f to denote a function with domain (0, 1)"'. The range of f is contained in Krn>,, -a finite field that is large enough but still of size polynomial in max(m,n). The meaning of "large enough" will vary but will be clear from context. The field K,,,,,, will always be constructible in time polynomial in max(m, n). The constants al, az,. . . are distinct elements of Km,n \ (0).
Consider g, the "arithmetization" off over K,,,+. is 1 if A = z and it is 0 otherwise.
Next, let
The multivariate polynomial g has the property that it agrees with f on all inputs in {0,1)".
For example, if f is the boolean function where @ denotes exclusive-or, the arithmetization is An envelope scheme is a protocol in which two computationally-unlimited processors achieve information-theoretically secure bat commitment. That is, committer Pl can compute and send to the receiver Pz a sequence of commitments, say c1, . . ., h, to a sequence of bits b l , . . ., b,. The sequence c1, . . ., c, conveys no information (in the Shannon sense) to the receiver about the sequence bl, . . ., b, (except its length).
At any time after the commitment takes place, Pz may challenge PI to decommit any c,. The envelope scheme must have the properties that PI can always prove that c; is a commitment to b; and that Pi can never prove that q is a commitment to 1 -bi.
Notice that, by definition, the security of an envelope scheme is two-sided: P z cannot find out any information about b, unless PI decommits, and P I cannot 'change its mind" about what it has committed. In Section 5.2 below, we present a result in the ideal envelope model, as opposed to the cryptographic model. That is, we assume that committer and receiver both have unlimited computational power and that an envelope scheme is given as a primitive.
A notarized envelope scheme is a protocol in which a prover commits to a sequence of bits 2 1 , . . ., x,,,, and then gives a zero-knowledge proof to a verifier that f ( z 1 , . . . ,xm) = 1, without revealing any information about 51, . . ., 2 , . Since the verifier has unlimited computational power in the ideal envelope model, a natural question to ask is why it cannot simply compute f ( s 1 , . . . , sm) without the help of the prover. The answer, of course, is that the verifier does not have r l , . . ., x,; rather it has the prover's commitments to X I , . . ., 2,.
The round complexity of a notarized envelope scheme or n-party protocol for a function f of m bits is the (worst-case) total number of rounds in an execution, as a function of n and m. Similarly, the bit complexity is the sum, over all i , of the sum of the lengths of all messages sent by P; in a (worst-case) execution. We use the following results in our constructions in Section 5 . 
Locally Random Reductions
Intuitively, a locally random reduction from a function f to a function g is a randomized polynomial-time mapping that takes an arbitrary instance 2 of f to a set {yl, . . ., yp} of random instances of g in such a way that f ( x ) is easily computable from g(yl), . . ., g(y,). A function f is random self-reducible if there is a locally random reduction from f to itself. We now define this concept more formally.
'There is actually no need to restrict attention to instancehiding schemes that "leak at most n." Refer to [7, Section 21 for a detailed description of the general model. #(z,r,g(ul(z,r) , r ) , . . ., uiC(,,,)(q, r)) and ( o i l (~z , r ) , . . ., ~i~{~) ( z~, r ) )
are identically distributed.
More succinctly, we say that f is ( t , p ) -h to 9 .
Informally, if T is a subset of the target instances . .,g(uM(,,,)(x,r))) can be made to hold for all r , by appropriate choice of the field Km,n.
Note that a (l,,u)-lrr from f to g can be thought of as a one-round, p-oracle instance-hiding scheme for f. The querier Po chooses r , computes the target instances yi = o;(z,r), for 1 5 i 5 p, and sends each y; to a separate g-oracle Pi. Pi then sends back g(yi), for 1 5 i 5 p, and Po computes f(z) using 4, z, r , and the values {g(yi)}.
The following special case of Definition 4.1 is important: f is ( 1 ,~) -l r r to g, and each of the random instances ui(z,r) is distributed uniformly over all g-instances of the appropriate length (although, as usual, pairs of instances ui(z, r ) and uj(x, r ) are dependent). In this case, the average-case complexity of g gives an upper bound (up to polynomial factors) on the worst-case complexity of f . This property of locally random reductions is used to prove that the permanent function is as hard on average as it is in the worst case (cf.
[ZS]) and to show that, for every (finite) function f , there is a polynomial g such that g is as hard on average as f is in the worst case (cf. [7] ).
More precisely, it is shown in [7] that every function f of m inputs bits is (1, m+l)-lrr to a polynomial g. We repeat this construction here and improve upon it in Section 5.1 below. , g ( y l ) ) All of the results we present in Section j use locally random reductions in an essential way. This notion of reducibility has also been applied to interactive proof systems ( cf. [2, 29, 34] ), and to program checking, testing, and self correcting (cf. [14, 15, 281 ). An extensive treatment of the complexity-theoretic aspects of random selfreducibility can be found in [20, 211. ql(a,), . . . , q,(a;)) . The function 4 recovers h ( w ) by interpolating the polynomial H ( 2 ) from the pairs (ai, h(y;) ).
Results

Instance-Hiding Schemes
The second requirement of Definition 4.1 is satisfied for the same reason that Shamir's secret-sharing scheme works (cf. 
I
The relationship between the multivariate polynomial g and the univariatc polynomial G in Section 4 is a special case of the relationship between the polynomials h and H that we use here; in that sppcial case, t = 1. I By taking t ( m ) = 1, we get the desired result on instance-hiding schemes. 
Notarized Envelope Schemes
In this section, we show how to build a notarized envelope scheme with low communication complexity, starting with an ordinary envelope scheme. The notation f and g is as in Section 3.
Let P and V denote the prover and verifier of the notarized envelope scheme, In most of the literature on interactive proof systems, V denotes a probabilistic, polynomial-time verifier. Therefore, we stress that, in a notarized envelope scheme, no limitation is placed of the computational power of V .
Intuitively, player P in our notarized envelope scheme plays the roles of t h e querier and all of the oracles in the instance-hiding scheme of [7] . Player V then challenges the prover t o demonstrate that it played both roles faithfully. In the following protocol, the quantifiers ('for 1 5 i 5 m + 1" and "for 1 5 j 5 m" are implicit in each step in which the subscript a or j occurs.
Notarized Envelope Scheme to show that f(z1,. . . , z , ) = 1
Step 1. P commits to xj.
Step 2. P selects random cj uniformly at random from Km,n and lets q j ( 2 ) = c j Z + x3. Then P computes (YI,,, . . . ,ym,i) = (q1(ai) , . . . , qm(ai)) and 2): = g(yl,,, . . . , Y~, , ) .
S t e p 3. P commits to q j , (y1,*, . . . , y m , , ) . and 2';.
Step 4. P uses a standard notarized envelope scheme to prove to V that q j ( 0 ) = xj, that p 3 ( m ; ) = y j , i , and that {(mi, ui)) interpo' +e a degree-m polynomial with constant term 1. V rejects (and terminates the protoLa1) if any of these proofs fail.
Step 5 . V chooses I; uniformiy from (1.. . . . m + 1) and sends it to P.
S t e p 6. P decommits ( y l , k , . . . ,ym,kj, and U k .
S t e p 7. V accepts if and only if g ( y l , k , . , . .ym,i;) = u k . 
T h e o r e m 5.2 T h e protocol j u s t gaven
1).
Proof (sketch): The fact that this protocol satisfies the requirements of a notarized envelope scheme follows from the fact that qj(a,) is uniformly distributed over A',,,,, the properties of the standard notarized envelope schemes, the definition of envelopes, and the fact that V has the power to compute g. We first argue that this protocol satisfies the necessary security requirements. That is, we claim that no information about 2 1 , . . . ,x, (but for the value of m) is revealed to V. By the properties of the standard notarized envelope schemes, the bits revealed during any of these zeroknowledge proofs are independent of the values of z l , . . . , 2,. It also follows from a straightforward analysis that these revealed bits are independent of the values of yl,k,. . . , Ym,k for 1 5 k 5 m + 1. By the properties of our locally random reduction, we have that Y l , k , . . . , ym,k is uniformly distributed over K,", and is thus independent of 21,. . . , Z m . Finally, we note that Vk is completely determined by Y l , k , . . . , ym,k, and thus contributes no additional information about xl,. . . ,x,.
Part (A) follows from the properties of the older notarized envelope schemes, and the fact that the prover never makes an untrue assertion.
To prove (B), observe that, if P cheats: then either one of the assertions that he makes in Step 4 is wrong (and thus V will reject with high probability), or at least one of the vi's is not equal to g(yl,;, . . . , ym,*) (and thus V will reject with probability at least I/(m + 1) in Step 7).
Part ( C ) follows from the parallelizability of the earlier notarized envelope schemes.
Note that we are working in the ideal envelope model, in which zero-knowledge proofs can be run in parallel without losing their zero-knowledge properties. Recall that player Pi's input is z;, which is some subset of the bits X I , . . ., 5 , .
We first exhibit a protocol that satisfies the weaker requirement of t-privacy, where t = ((mlogn)/m). That is, as many as t players may collude to discover others' inputs, but all players compute and send all required values correctly. We then show how to enhance the basic protocol to achieve t-resilience. When we "run a subprotocol" to compute intermediate values, we use the resilient n-party protocol of Bar-Ilan and Beaver [3] .
We say that a player t-secretly shares b when the player selects q ( 2 ) = ctZ' + . . . + clZ + b by choosing each c, independently and uniformly at random, and sends q(cyi) to Pi, for 1 5 i 5 n. The quantifiers "for 1 5 z,j 5 n" and "for 1 5 I5 s" are implicit in each step in which the subscripts i, j, and 1 occur.
An n-party protocol to compute f(z1, . . . , zm)
Step 1. P; t-secretly shares each bit of zi.
Step 2. Run a subprotocol to compute 201 and t-secretly share it. Let (yl,,, .. . , ys,;) denote the shares scnt to Pi.
Step 3. P; computes w; = h(yl,;, . . . , yd,;) and t-secretly shares it.
Step 4. Run a subprotocol to interpolate the polynomial H ( 2 ) from { ( o y ,~; ) } and reveal to everyone the constant term, which is f(q,. . . , z, , , ).
Observe first that this basic protocol is correct, is t-private, has constant round complexity, and has polynomial bit complexity. Essentially, this follows from the properties of Shamir's secret-sharing scheme and from Theore'm 3.2, because the subprotocols of Steps 2 and 4 use poly-size, log-depth circuits: change of variables, selection of random polynomials, polynomial evaluation and polynomial interpolation.
To achieve ( ( n l o g n)/rn) resilience, we add another subprotocol between Steps 3 and 4. In this subprotocol, each player Pi proves in zero-knowledge that he has computed w; correctly. These proofs are accomplished using the notarized envelope scheme of Section 5.2 and a (constant-round, polynomial-bits) majority-voting scheme. "Envelopes" need not be assumed as a primitive (as they are in the ideal envelope model of Section 5.2), because they can be implemented using verifiable secret-sharing (cf. T .  Rabin [30] ). In the resilient version of the protocol, verifiable secret sharing is used in all steps in which ordinary secret sharing is used in the private version. 1 Correctness proofs for multiparty protocols are both complicated and elusive.
To our knowledge, no proof of correctness for any general multiparty protocol has been widely examined and found to be completely rigorous. Indeed, there is no universally accepted standard for what secure multiparty computation should actually entail. Furthermore, there are no rigorously proven composition results for these protocols. Any rigorous use of these basic protocol constructions must contend with these difficulties.
It is likely that the techniques necessary to prove the results of [3, 13, 17, 311 cleanly and rigorously will also suffice to analyze our protocol. In the meantime, our strategy is to compartmentalize these earlier results so that we can truly treat them as black boxes. Toward this end, we will first consider a trusted servant abstraction for multiparty protocols. In addition to the n players, of potentially infinite power, we include an auxiliary player (the servant) with the following properties.
